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Publication Date: 3/1/78
Pages: 90 Date Entered: 2/23/84 Title: STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT OF SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR TRANSPORTATION (FOR COMMENT) March 1978 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT REGULATORY GUIDE 5.56 STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT OF SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR TRANSPORTATION INTRODUCTION The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), directed the NRC, among other things, to develop contigency plans". . .for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear materials, high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities resulting from all activities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. . . ." The principal requirements for the development of safeguards contingency plans for transportation are found in 10 CFR Part 70, "Special Nuclear Materials," and Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." Paragraph 70.22(g) of 10 CFR Part 70 identifies the requirements for a safeguards contingency plan for transportation. Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73 identifies the criteria to be followed in developing the contingency plan. A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a document that provides guidance to licensee personnel and identifies procedures to accomplish specific, defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities. An acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain (1) a predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and actions, and (3) a specification of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action. A safeguards contingency plan consists of five elements: (1) Background, (2) a Generic Planning Base, (3) a Licensee Planning Base, (4) a Responsibility Matrix, and (5) Procedures. The Background contains the purpose and scope of the plan, describes the environment within which the plan will be put into effect, and defines the terms used. The Generic Planning Base contains a list of events to be planned for and the associated objective to be reached for each event. It may also include for each event an overview of the general types of decisions and actions and other generic information helpful to the licensee in clearly presenting the planned responses to reach the objective. The Licensee Planning Base contains the information peculiar to a given licensee: his organizational entities for contingency response tasking, facility descriptions and locations necessary for response planning and coordination, command and control functions, etc. The Responsibility Matrix is a format used to specify the assignment of specific decisions and actions that each organizational entity takes to effect such response. For each organizational entity, the decisions and actions, as assigned in the Responsibility Matrix, are finally summarized in a Procedures Summary for that entity. The Procedures Summaries that result are simplified presentations of the assigned responsibilities for use in training and implementing the plan. The Procedures Summary, although part of the contingency plan, does not have to be submitted to the NRC for approval (see Chapter 5). This regulatory guide presents the proposed standard format for a safeguards contingency plan for transportation and contains an example contingency plan, included as a supplement, to illustrate the guide's application. The guide may be revised to reflect comments received and additional staff review. Purpose and Applicability This standard format and content document has been prepared to aid in ensuring completeness of planning and presentation and to simplify the NRC review of the safeguards contingency plan. It applies to the transportation of special nuclear material that is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR section 73.30 through section 73.36 (proposed 10 CFR section 73.25 and section 73.26, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977). This document describes the information required for a plan. Information submitted will be reviewed for completeness on the basis of the contents of this guide. If a submittal does not provide a reasonably complete presentation of the required information, final review will be delayed until the needed information is provided. It is anticipated that the safeguards contingency plan will be submitted as an attachment to the physical security plan (10 CFR section 70.22(g)). To the extent that the topics in the contingency plan are treated in adequate detail in a physical security plan, they may be incorporated by cross-reference to the security plan. The applicant or licensee should include additional information as appropriate. It is also the responsibility of the applicant or licensee to be aware of new and revised NRC regulations. Information and procedures delineated in regulatory guides in Division 5, "Materials and Plant Protection," and technical reports and appropriate to certain sections of the physical security plan submitted under Paragraph 70.22(g) of 10 CFR Part 70 or 10 CFR section 73.30 through section 73.36 (proposed 10 CFR section 73.25 and section 73.26, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977) may be incorporated by reference. The applicant, licensee, or agent should discuss his plans and programs with the NRC staff before preparing his contingency plan, giving particular emphasis to the depth of information required for this plan. Use of the Standard Format The standard format and content is described in succeeding chapters and is illustrated in the example plan presented in the supplement. If the applicant or licensee chooses to adopt the standard format and content, he should follow the numbering system of this document at least down to the level of subsection (e.g., 3.5.1). Certain subsections may be omitted from a contingency plan if they are clearly unnecessary to provide a complete plan or if they are needlessly repetitive. In such cases appropriate adaptation of the standard format to accommodate the particular circumstances is permissible. The applicant or licensee may wish to submit in support of his contingency plan information that is not required by regulations and is not essential to the description of the physical protection program. Such information could include, for example, historical data submitted in demonstration of certain criteria, discussions of alternatives considered, or supplementary data regarding assumed models, data, or calculations. This type of information should be clearly labeled and provided as an attachment to the submittal so that it will not be considered as a license condition. Style and Composition The applicant or licensee should strive for a clear, concise presentation of information that portrays the general perspective and concepts of the basic plan. Details about specific aspects of the plan may be relegated to the appendices to enhance the clarity of the presentation in the basic plan and to facilitate updating and maintenance of the information. Confusing or ambiguous statements and general statements of intent should be avoided. Definitions and abbreviations should be consistent throughout the submittal and should be consistent with generally accepted usage unless otherwise defined in the document. Drawings, diagrams, and tables should be used when information may be presented more clearly or conveniently by such means. In general, these illustrations should be located in the section where they are first referenced. Care should be taken to ensure that all information presented in drawings is legible, that symbols are defined, and that drawings are not reduced to the extent that they cannot be read by unaided normal eyes. A table of contents should be included in each submittal. Physical Specifications of Submittals All materials submitted in a safeguards contingency plan should conform to the following physical dimensions of page size, quality of paper and inks, numbering of pages, etc.: 1. Page Size Text pages: 8-1/2 x 11 inches. Drawings and graphics: 8-1/2 x 11 inches preferred; however, a larger size is acceptable provided the finished copy when folded does not exceed 8-1/2 x 11 inches. 2. Paper Stock and Ink Suitable quality in substance, paper color, and ink density for handling and for microfilming. 3. Page Margins A margin of no less than one inch should be maintained on the top, bottom, and binding side of all pages submitted. 4. Printing Composition: text pages should be single spaced. Type face and style: must be suitable for microfilming. Reproduction: may be mechanically or photographically reproduced. Pages may be printed on both sides with the images printed head to head. 5. Binding Pages should be punched for standard 3-hole looseleaf binder. 6. Page Numbering Pages should be numbered sequentially. 7. Format References In the application, references to this Standard Format should be by chapter and section numbers. Procedures for Updating or Revising Pages The updating or revising of data and text should be on a replacement page basis. The changed or revised portion of each page should be highlighted by a vertical line. The line should be on the margin opposite the binding margin for each line changed or added. All pages submitted to update, revise, or add pages to the plan should show the date of change. The transmittal letter should include an index page listing the pages to be inserted and the pages to be removed. When major changes or additions are made, pages for a revised Table of Contents should be provided. Number of Copies The applicant or licensee should submit 6 copies to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. Alternatively, these copies may be filed in person at the Commission's offices at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. or at 7915 Eastern Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland. Public Disclosure The NRC has determined that safeguards contingency plans contain information of a type specified in 10 CFR section 2.790(d) and shall be subject to disclosure only in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR section 9.12. Compatibility The applicant or licensee should ensure that the contingency plan is compatible with the other sections of his application. Reference to sections in the physical security plan may be made in response to information requested by this guide. 1. BACKGROUND 1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER Provide a statement of the perceived danger to the security of licensee personnel and licensee property posed by the possibility of attempts to commit sabotage or to steal strategic special nuclear materials. The adversary attributes assumed for safeguards contingency planning stem from those specified by NRC as a basis for current safeguards system design or upgrading. The statement contained in 10 CFR section 73.55(a) or subsequent Commission statements will suffice. The information is included in the safeguards contingency plan for ready reference and clarity with regard to the adversary capabilities that are assumed to oppose the performance of the primary security mission of the plan. The applicant or licensee should examine his operation to determine its vulnerabilities in light of the threats postulated by the Commission. This examination is to make the applicant or licensee more aware of the total scope of response and will facilitate the generation of initiating events for the Generic Planning Base. 1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN State the general aims and purposes underlying the implementation of the plan, e.g., the transportation activities covered, general uses intended for the plan, etc. 1.3 SCOPE OF THE PLAN Discuss the scope of the plan by addressing the following information: 1. The general types of contingencies that have been considered, i.e., threats related to a shipment of SNM or an attempted theft or sabotage of a shipment while enroute. 2. The primary security mission (task to be accomplished) in response to an adversary incursion and the general operational concepts or approach to performing the mission. The mission statement simply reveals what is to be accomplished and when and why. The operational concept presents an overview of how the mission is to be accomplished. Also, for clarity of intent, the operational concept may indicate explicitly the conditions under which the plan might be executed, e.g., night, day, all weather, natural disasters, etc. 1.4 DEFINITIONS Alphabetically list the terms and the corresponding definitions used in describing the operational and technical aspects of the plan. 2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE Identify those events that signal the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency according to how they are first perceived by the licensee's or transportation agent's personnel, as applicable. A sufficient number of events should be identified to cover the range of possible safeguards contingencies that are envisioned. Generic specification of the events is suggested to limit the number that are required for the plan. Refer to Appendix A of the supplement for examples illustrating the manner of specifying these events. For each event identified, specify the objective to be accomplished by the operational elements when they respond to that particular event. In selecting an objective, consideration should be given to uncertainties about the situation that generally will prevail as of the time the subject events occur. For example, if information available at the time is likely to be so vague that the operational elements will be uncertain whether or not an adversary incursion is in progress, an appropriate objective for the event would involve determining what the actual situation is. Attainment of this objective would in turn clarify the situation and lead to the next event and objective most appropriate for the continued response in order to accomplish the primary security mission, which is reflected in Section 1.3. In addition to the required information above, other information that is helpful to the licensee (or transportation agent) in preparing or clearly presenting the general nature of the planned responses to achieve the selected objectives may be included in the generic planning base. For example, listing of the categories of actions or the general approach that will be taken by the overall response organization to accomplish a given objective may be helpful in planning, assigning, and subsequent training of personnel in the specific response actions developed in the Responsibility Matrix relating to that objective. Such listing would be tantamount to presenting a limited operational concept that is specifically applicable to the attainment of the particular objective. Another type of information that may be helpful for ready reference is an illustration that shows sequential relationships among all the generic events and objectives utilized for planning. 3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE In successive paragraphs, briefly present information about the licensee's organization, infrastructure, capabilities, constraints, law enforcement assistance, and other considerations that bear upon the execution of the contingency responses of the plan. Only current capabilities should be reflected to ensure realistic prospects for plan execution in the event of a contingency during the current period. Where applicable, reference may be made to parts of the physical security plan where pertinent information is adequately presented, rather than repeating the particular information in the safeguards contingency plan. Types of information that should be considered for inclusion in the plan are further described below. Use additional paragraphs as necessary to present other pertinent information. 3.1 LICENSEE'S (OR TRANSPORTATION AGENT'S) ORGANIZATION FOR SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY RESPONSE Provide a description of the organization adopted for purposes of planning, assigning, and conducting coordinated safeguards contingency response actions to attain the specified objectives presented in the Generic Planning Base. This task organization should reflect the type of personnel and principal equipments composing the various operational entities that appear in the Responsibility Matrix and Procedures Summaries; these are the entities in the plan that implement detailed contingency response actions. The general procedure for designating the leaders and alternate leaders and the composition of the operational entities for a specific shipment should also be reflected in this paragraph. 3.2 ROUTE INFORMATION Information on planned road routes routinely used to transport SNM in quantities requiring physical protection should be presented in this paragraph, either directly or by reference to pertinent appendices of the basic plan. For brevity and clarity of presentation in the basic plan, the route information generally is best presented in appendices; one appendix should be devoted to each planned route. With regard to assembling necessary data for planned road routes, it is contemplated that NRC will undertake a task to cover the most commonly and frequently used routes for interstate transport of protected SNM. When the information is compiled on a route, NRC will provide it to licensees or their agents. The licensees or their agents may include this information in their respective transportation safeguards contingency plans with the understanding that they accept responsibility for its continued accuracy. For routes used as a matter of convenience to a particular licensee or agent when a suitable NRC planned route is available or for one-time or seldom-used routes, the licensee or his agent is responsible for assembling the necessary data and planning the route. The plan for such a route should be submitted to NRC for review and approval if it is contemplated as an addition to the safeguards contingency plan by the licensee or agent. For each route, the route information should include route segment identifications, pertinent time and distance factors, route reference points and directions to locations of pertinent law enforcement facilities, and the expected response capabilities of the associated law enforcement agencies. Tables and charts required for presentation of the information are illustrated in Appendix E of the example plan presented in the Supplement and are further explained below. 1. Route Overview - This is a graphic display of the overall route presented on one or more sheets. It may be a line diagram as in the example plan, or it may be depicted on a road map. The map or diagram should be large enough in scale to clearly indicate the pertinent law enforcement agency (LEA) to be contacted for contingency assistance. The planned route segments should be reflected on the display. route segments selected for planning should have easily recognized geographic features as boundaries and should be easily correlated with the pertinent LEA. For example, if a pertinant LEA is a county sherriff's department, a route segment marked by the county boundaries (if easily recognized on the ground) or other geographic features near the county boundaries would be appropriate. The enroute overview should also show the location of each pertinent LEA relative to the route, the route's origin and destination, state boundaries as applicable, and other information that will aid in rapidly correlating route position with the LEA appropriate for that position. 2. Time and Distance Factors - This is a table showing the following information for each planned route segment: a. Identification code of the segment. b. LEA pertinent to the segment. c. Segment boundaries (start and end points). d. Distance of the segment in road miles. e. Total trip miles traveled from origin to end of the segment. f. Average time required to transit the segment. g. Total trip time elapsed at the end of the segment. h. Estimated variability in time for crossing the segment and the variability of total trip time at the end of the segment. i. Critical reference points that give detailed route instructions for movement to the location of the pertinent LEA. 3. Law Enforcement Response Summary - This is a table that summarizes for each pertinent LEA the expected response, the emergency telephone numbers and other communications means, and selected segment information. It provides quick reference data to facilitate communication with pertinent LEA and to estimate response times after the contact. 4. Law Enforcement Capabilities - This is a brief narrative description of the LEA capabilities. The description should be adequate to provide the enroute supervisor a general overview of each enroute LEA's strength, mobility, communications, weapons, and other capabilities that are available if needed. 3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFACE AND ASSISTANCE For the transportation safeguards contingency plan, details regarding LEA assistance along road routes are more simply presented in connection with the applicable route information (see Section 3.2). Therefore, simple reference in this section to the location of that LEA information in the plan serves to highlight it for ready reference. Other general LEA information not contained in the referenced material, however, may be applicable to this section. For example, to enhance clarity, this section might also be used to briefly describe the general nature of requests for enroute LEA assistance that will be made if the need arises. Other general information regarding LEA assistance deemed appropriate for clarity or emphasis by the licensee or agent may be included. 3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS Identify laws, company policies, or other factors that will substantially constrain or otherwise influence execution of response actions during contingency situations. This may include, but need not be limited to, the following areas as applicable: 1. Extent to which local, county, and State law enforcement will be depended on to protect shipments against adversary intrusion and theft incidents. 2. Extent to which company employees will be allowed to perform hazardous physical security duties incident to accomplishing safeguards contingency response actions. 3. Extent to which enroute personnel can assist LEA in hot pursuit operations. 4. Equipment performance constraints dictating specially planned procedures. 3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS Information concerning the planned control arrangements and the use and operation of the various means of communication (licensee and LEA as applicable) during safeguards contingency response operations should be included in this section. Emphasis should be on the planned operating procedures that are to apply for coordination of the various operational entities involved. The information on control arrangements should clearly reflect who controls what and when. Also, as applicable, the manner of passing control from one point of leadership to another during progress of a contingency situation should be specific. The leader of any operational entity is presumed to be in control of that entity unless otherwise specified. With regard to communications, the allocation, control, and usage of the various means of communications should be specific along with any special instructions that apply regarding operation of the equipment. As applicable, the specification and use of various codes for rapid communication of situational information also are appropriate items for this section. Details may be relegated to an appendix in the interest of clarity in the basic plan. 3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS As applicable, information of operational significance to the utilization of safeguards systems equipment may be included here or elsewhere in the plan, as desired for clarity. For example, the location of special weapons and protective equipment that are available if needed might be indicated here or in the section on operational elements. Also, information concerning communications equipment might be more appropriately included in the control and communications section than here. Information of interest in this section is the type that is necessary to coordinate commitment or use of the equipment during contingency response operations, e.g., its location if not installed, who obtains it, what operating modes apply and when, the readiness state maintained, etc. Descriptive information on system configuration and technical performance characteristics may be included by reference to appropriate parts of an approved transportation physical security plan if such information is felt necessary in the interest of clarity. If no information is included in this section, the simple statement "This section not used", should be inserted. 3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS Describe any special arrangements and practices that are maintained or implemented to ensure adequate administrative and logistical support incident to enroute safeguards contingency events. The descriptions should include provisions for ensuring that all equipment and expendable supplies needed to effectively deal with an enroute safeguards contingency will be easily accessible, in good working order, and in sufficient supply. Particular attention should be focused on extra supplies and equipment such as radio batteries, ammunition, special weapons, gas masks, body armor, and helmets that could substantially affect the effectiveness of response personnel. Include also the planned arrangement for provision of necessary emergency services incident to enroute safeguard contingency operations, such as medical evacuation and treatment of casualties, health physics, and vehicle maintenance. If standard procedures are applicable in that regard, a statement and brief explanation to that effect is appropriate. 4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX Develop a Responsibility Matrix corresponding to the Generic Planning Base. The tabulations in the Responsibility Matrix should provide an overall picture of the response actions and their interrelationships. The Responsibility Matrix illustrated below is in array format to facilitate systematic presentation and crosscheck of the contingency response actions planned for each operational element. The three dimensions depicted are: "Events," "Operational Elements," and "Decisions-Actions." Each Event should correspond to one of the contingency events selected in the Generic Planning Base (Chapter 2). The Decisions-Actions for each Event should delineate the decisions and actions and their assignment to the responsible Operational Element (Sections 3.1 and 3.3) so as to gain the objective associated with that Event in the Generic Planning Base. One or more pages may be used to present the contingency actions associated with each event, depending on the number of operational elements involved in the plan and the amount of column width allocated for each operational element. The matrix format shown in the "Representative Safeguards Contingency Plan for Road Transportation" contained in the Supplement has spaces for five different operational elements on two pages of presentation for each contingency event; however, more or less may be used as necessary. It may be noted that the example matrix contained in the Supplement also shows the objective associated with each contingency event in two places: the first column and at the top in one other column. The presentation is for ease of reference. The first column permits quick reference during development and maintenance of the plan, and the other column serves to identify the particular operational element that decides when that objective has been attained. Safeguards responsibilities must be assigned in a manner that precludes conflicts in duties or responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the plan in any safeguards contingency. 5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY Develop a Procedures Summary for each operational element that summarizes the actions from the Responsibility Matrix for assignment to that operational element. The set of Procedures Summaries that results is to aid in the assignment and training of tasks for effective implementation of the plan. The procedures summary, although part of the contingency plan, does not have to be submitted to NRC for approval. It will be prepared and maintained at the licensee's facility and will be inspected by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement to ensure compliance with the Responsibility Matrix. Each Procedures Summary should provide clear and concise statements of the general responsibilities of the operational element during any safeguards contingency and of the specific actions assigned with respect to the range of contingency events covered in the plan. In that regard, show where a task begins and follow its progress through each operational element until the task is completed; i.e., show the actions that each of the operational elements accomplishes to carry out the task. In summarizing actions from the Responsibility Matrix, a given set of summary statements may be utilized to cover more than one event when the events involved require the same or effectively the same type of actions. Also, where a given action is found to be common procedure for a number of operational elements, regardless of the specific contingency, that action may be included in a summary grouping of standard operating procedures for presentation in each of the procedures summaries. Statements of standard operating procedures may also reflect information of general interest to all operational entities, for example, the assignment of overall control responsibilities. To facilitate operations, the licensee may wish to condense key portions of the Procedures Summary to checklist format according to stages of increased preparedness to respond. For example, events deemed to require a comparable level of preparedness may be grouped under some predetermined alert code, e.g., yellow alert for conditions that are not perceived as imminent but do require a further enhanced state of readiness (some expressed threats, non-threatening civil demonstrations, unresolved perimeter alarms, etc.). When the condition is evaluated and deemed to require an enhanced state of readiness, the alert posture is increased to an appropriate higher level, e.g., orange or red. In effect, the events are grouped in alert categories by their sensitivity and assessed immediacy. To achieve the assigned alert status, checklists are used by each operational element as reminders to perform specificially assigned duties. 1. BACKGROUND 1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER For planning purposes, it is assumed that an adversary incursion against the shipment to steal or to sabotage the cargo could occur at any time while enroute with little or no prior warning. Also, as a hoax or with serious intent, a potential adversary could threaten to steal or sabotage the cargo. The assumed adversaries may be well-trained and dedicated persons with no responsibility for the shipment (external adversaries) or knowledgeable persons with assigned responsibilities with respect to the shipment (internal adversaries). It is assumed that an attempted incursion will be well planned and rehearsed and will be directed toward accomplishing the adversary mission and withdrawing from the scene as quickly as possible. An external adversary may include one to a small group of armed or unarmed persons. If armed, their weapons could vary from hand guns and shotguns to mixtures of weapons such as automatic rifles and explosives. Tactics employed might include armed hijack, ruse, duress, rolling or static ambush, or opportunistic theft of the cargo carrier. Coordinated team movements and use of weapons might be employed in furtherance of these tactics. External adversaries might also be assisted by an internal conspirator. An internal adversary may be a member of the enroute elements (Escort or Transporter) and thus would be armed as the enroute elements are. Such an individual may endeavor to steal the cargo himself through use of force or ruse or to assist external adversaries by decoying the shipment or by creating diversions that may weaken the cargo vehicle's security coverage. An internal adversary not a member of the enroute elements might also be involved in a conspiracy with an external adversary. In such cases, the internal adversary may assist the external by providing specific shipment information or by deceptions to cover the activities of the external adversary. 1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN This document presents the safeguards contingency plan for road transportation of a representative company that provides transportation for nuclear materials that require physical protection for compliance with NRC regulations. The plan was prepared to guide and coordinate response actions of the operating elements involved against perceived or actual incursion attempts to steal or sabotage the cargo of a road shipment. 1.3 SCOPE AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF THE PLAN 1.3.1Types of Contingencies and Responses that have been Considered Responses to deal with and prevent successful execution of threats and attempts of theft of SNM sabotage are covered in the plan. The safeguards contingency plan does not include any actions under emergency plans concerned with hazards to public health and safety that are the consequence of nuclear accidents other than steps to initiate the implementation of such emergency plans even though those accidents may result from acts of threats, thefts, or sabotage. 1.3.2Operational Concept in Response to an Adversary Incursion The primary security mission of the operating elements is to protect the cargo at all times during its road shipment from point of origin to point of destination to prevent theft or sabotage of any part of the cargo. This mission is accomplished routinely by protecting the cargo at all times and by coordination among the operational elements to ensure a high state of readiness to deal with contingency situations if they occur. MVMT Control maintains current information of the shipment's status and the on-going enroute situation and coordinates with enroute LEA as necessary to ensure early LEA awareness of possible security threats against the shipment. Additionally, the enroute elements continuously guard the cargo in transit and maintain all-around security surveillance of the local scene to avoid being surprised by incursions against the shipment if they are attempted. Cargo stowage is kept locked, sealed, and alarmed, as applicable, and the transporter moves via well-traveled routes at maximum speed limits when possible, making only essential stops. To accomplish the mission under the extraordinary circumstances of a contingency situation, the enroute elements will contact the pertinent LEA for assistance as necessary and will deal with the situation to protect the shipment until the LEA response effectively develops. As a hedge against the chance that enroute elements may not be able to contact the LEA in an emergency, MVMT Control will request assistance of pertinent LEA in the event that enroute elements fail to render a report as expected. The mobility of the shipment will be used by enroute elements to avoid a perceived incursion wherever possible. Otherwise, depending on the nature and strength of the adversary, enroute elements will block or delay the incursion to prevent penetration of the cargo transporter. In the event an adversary gains possession of any part of the cargo and endeavors to depart, enroute elements will follow and maintain contact as necessary to assist LEA convergence in pursuit. 1.4 DEFINITIONS Terms and expressions used in the plan are alphabetically listed and defined below for ease of reference. Term Definition (A) Notation used in Responsibility Matrix, Appendix C, that indicates an action is always taken; the action may be a hedge against uncertainty or necessary in light of the situation. (C) Notation used in Responsibility Matrix, Appendix C, that indicates an action may or may not be taken depending on the obvious circumstances of the situation. CB Citizens band radio. ETA Estimated time of arrival. ETD Estimated time of departure. FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation. FCC Federal Communications Commission. ID Identification. LEA Law enforcement agency(ies). MT Mobile radiotelephone. MVMT Movement. NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region ______, Office of Inspection and Enforcement. Sabotage A malevolent act that damages and results in dispersal of nuclear material. Shipper The terminal element--consignor or consignee--who arranged with the company providing nuclear materials transportation services for the nuclear shipment of concern. SNM Special nuclear material. Stolen SNM SNM that has been acquired unlawfully and is being held in a safe haven by the thief. 2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE The operational elements indicated in Section 3.1 will respond as a team to events that either suggest or reveal an adversary incursion against the shipment. The types of events experienced and the clarity of the situation at the time will depend on the nature of the incursion, the state to which the siuuation has progressed, and the amount of interaction that has occurred between the adversary and the operational elements. The total response from start to finish will be a dynamic process conditioned by the circumstances of the situation as it progresses. As a means of planning for contingencies, a set of 16 events has been specified to cover the range of events that will trigger contingency response actions by the operational elements. For each of these events, the most important objective to be achieved by the operational elements responding to the particular event has been identified. Attainment of the objective will improve the situation to the extent possible at the time and will lead to the next event and the objective most appropriate for continued dealing with the situation. Appendix A summarizes the events and objectives of the Generic Planning Base and codes each combination for ease of access to the detailed task planning reflected in the Responsibility Matrix (Appendix C). 3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE 3.1 OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS The following operational elements are the organizational entities adopted for purposes of assigning and executing the road transportation security response tasks and procedures identified in this plan. The designated leaders and specific composition of the operational entities are specified in the instructions issued for each shipment. Functional Category Operational Elements Transportation 1. Escort 2. Transporter 3. MVMT Control Terminal Elements 4. Consignor 5. Consignee 1. Escort is tailored to provide the security needs for a given shipment in light of the cargo that is to be protected, the vulnerability of the route that will be used, and the response capabilities of the pertinent enroute LEA. The Escort includes: a. One or more unmarked cars equipped with mobile telephone, citizens band radio, vehicle-to-vehicle VHF communications, and shotguns. b. At least two armed guards per vehicle, inclusive of the driver. 2. Transporter includes the cargo transporter equipped with mobile telephone, citizens band radio, vehicle-to-vehicle VHF communications, and shotguns. The Transporter may also feature armored-protected crew compartment, firing ports, and an enclosed cargo trailer with an immobilization system. If an open cargo trailer is employed, individual cargo containers will weigh at least 500 pounds. Normally two armed guards, inclusive of the driver, constitute the crew of the Transporter. 3. MVMT Control includes: a. An adequately furnished operations center room with dedicated telephone equipment and the pertinent transportation plan and shipment plan information. b. One or more staff members inclusive of the Operations Center supervisor, as needed for continuous operational coverage of on-going shipments. 4. The Consignor and Consignee are represented by the shipper and receiver staff members designated to monitor the shipment status and to make operational decisions and arrangements concerning the shipment in coordination with MVMT Control. 3.2 ROUTE INFORMATION Pertinent time and distance data and law enforcement jurisdictions needed for shipment planning and operations are presented for each route in a series of appendices to this plan (see, for example, Appendix E). 3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE Selected law enforcement agencies (LEA) whose jurisdictions are crossed when the shipment is enroute will be requested, as needed, to provide contingency assistance to the shipment. LEA contacts and capabilities for assistance along a particular route are presented in the appendix for that route. In general, the enroute LEA will be depended on to provide assistance by investigating and providing information on suspicious activity and events, by dealing with unlawful incursions against the shipment, and by providing assistance to arrange local supporting services and traffic control when required. 3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS The following constraints and assumptions are reflected in this plan and will influence the conduct of operational activities during execution: 1. Enroute elements will depend on available LEA assistance to the maximum extent possible to deal with unlawful incursions against the shipment. 2. Enroute elements will use firearms only as a last resort when other tactics fail to provide adequate protection of the shipment or enroute personnel against violent incursion attempts. 3. Enroute elements will conduct operations to protect the shipment in a manner that avoids injury to innocent bystanders and needless damage to private or public property. 4. It is possible that enroute elements will be unable to use the mobile electronic communications equipment to report the situation and request LEA assistance during the emergency because of communication dead zones that exist along the route for the operating equipment. 3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS Communications equipment and procedures used during a shipment are indicated in Appendix B. The control relationships among the operating elements are presented below: 3.5.1Enroute Elements 1. The enroute supervisor will be designated in the movement order for a shipment. The enroute supervisor will designate an alternate to ensure continuity of control enroute. The enroute supervisor controls the operation of enroute elements, i.e.; * directs the movement and overall response actions of enroute elements. * requests assistance and coordinates operations with the LEA providing response assistance. * ensures that reports as required from enroute elements are made. 2. Escort and Transporter elements submit reports and request LEA assistance as dictated by the situation; Escort will normally be relied upon for such contacts to preclude stops by Transporter. 3.5.2MVMT Control 1. Accomplishes necessary coordination with Shipper (Consignor and Consignee, as applicable) during the shipment. 2. Monitors the status of the shipment and the enroute situation. 3. Coordinates with pertinent LEA to obtain investigative and security assistance as required and to inform LEA of possible security threats against the shipment. 3.5.3Consignor and Consignee Shipper coordinates with MVMT Control to monitor the shipment and to provide support and supervisory assistance to enroute elements as required. 3.5.4Enroute LEA 1. Directs and coordinates local operations of LEA response forces 2. Coordinates with other LEA as required to obtain additional investigative and response assistance if needed. 3. Coordinates local enroute LEA response operations with the enroute supervisor. 3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS This section not used. 3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL 3.7.1Enroute Supplies 1. Transporter and Escort vehicle will be refueled at times selected to minimize enroute stops and to randomly vary the refueling points utilized along a route. 2. Spare replacement batteries for portable electronic equipment will be carried enroute elements as appropriate to the type of equipment being used. 3. Extra ammunition will be carried in each vehicle for the weapons available in that vehicle. 3.7.2Vehicle Maintenance Enroute requirements for vehicle maintenance and evacuation service will be reported to MVMT Control. MVMT Control will arrange for the service in accordance with company maintenance procedures. 3.7.3Medical Services Local enroute hospitals will be used for emergency medical treatment. Emergency medical evacuation to the hospitals can be arranged through contact with the pertinent enroute LEA. 3.7.4Health Physics Service In the event of cargo dispersal while enroute due to adversary action or an accident, additional radiation monitoring service as required will be arranged by MVMT Control through contact with the Consignor or Consignee and DOE radiological assistance, as appropriate. Pertinent LEA may also be contacted to arrange for local civil defense preparedness assistance where applicable. 3.7.5Materials Handling In the event Transporter immobilization requires transfer of the cargo to another vehicle MVMT Control will arrange with the Consignor or Consignee, as appropriate, for advisory personnel to monitor and assist in the transfer. MVMT Control will also arrange for the replacement carrier, materials handling equipment, and necessary additional labor as required. 4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX Within the context of the general responsibilities that are assigned to each operating element, the planning of detailed tasks to support the attainment of the contingency objectives (specified in the Generic Planning Base, Appendix A) has been accomplished through use of the Responsibility Matrix in Appendix C. This appendix also lists tasks for the operating elements that are assigned and practiced as standard operating procedure during a shipment to enhance the readiness of the operating elements for executing the specific tasks reflected in the Responsibility Matrix. 5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY To facilitate training and plan implementation, a Procedures Summary for each operating element is contained in Appendix D. These procedures present the general responsibilities of the operating elements, the applicable standard operating procedures, and summaries of the contingency task sequences that are assigned the elements via the Responsibility Matrix (Appendix C). In the event security contingencies that are not reflected in the contingency task sequences occur, operational elements will coordinate their response in accordance with the general responsibilities and standard operating procedures indicated in the procedures summary so as to accomplish the primary security mission (Subsection 1.3.2). APPENDIX A EVENTS AND OBJECTIVES FOR CONTINGENCY RESPONSES ID Response Conditional Code Events Objectives Jumps T1 Explicit threat to steal Detemine if If serious, or sabotage cargo in threat as go to T4. transit is received before perceived is shipment departs. serious. T2 Explicit threat to steal Determine if If serious, or sabotage cargo in threat as go to T4. transit is received while perceived is enroute. serious. T3 A civil disturbance or Determine if If serious, other suspicious situation threat as go to T6. is encountered while perceived is enroute. serious. T4 Licensee/Agent or Enroute Prevent theft Elements perceive T1 or T2 or sabotage of serious. cargo T5 Duly constituted authority Prevent theft perceives a serious threat or sabotage of against SNM cargo in cargo. transit. T6 Enroute Elements perceive Prevent theft If attack T3 serious. or sabotage imminent of cargo. go to T8 or T9. T7 Event occurs while enroute Determine If danger, that temporarily degrades perceived go to T8 or T9. certain enroute safeguards. magnitude of danger. T8 Attack is perceived Prevent theft If theft or imminent or develops while or sabotage sabotage, go Transporter is at a stop. of cargo. to T10, T11, T16. T9 Attack is perceived Prevent theft If theft or imminent or develops while or sabotage sabotage, Transporter is moving. of cargo. go to T10, T11, T16. T10 Attack or accident has Restore occurred; Transporter or protection of Escort is damaged without the shipment. dispersal of SNM cargo. T11 Attack, sabotage, or Restore If theft, go accident has occurred; protection to T16. Transporter is damaged of the shipment. and SNM dispersed. T12 Code reserved for future revision. T13 Enroute Elements are Determine if If theft or reported delayed or SNM has been sabotage, go diverted from the planned stolen or to T10, T11, route. sabotaged. T14 MVMT Control does not Determine if If theft or receive expected report SNM has been sabotage, go from Enroute Elements. stolen or to T10, T11, sabotaged. T16. T15 Enroute Elements do not Determine if If theft or arrive at destination as SNM has been sabotage, go expected. stolen or to T10, T11, sabotaged. T16. T16 SNM in transit has been Report theft stolen. to NRC and FBI. APPENDIX B COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES 1. PURPOSE To outline procedures for use of radio equipment and other communications. 2. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT Radio equipment with enroute elements normally includes mobile radiotelephon citizens band radios, and vehicle-to-vehicle radios. In addition, regular teleph communications are used by operating elements as required. a. Mobile Radiotelephones (MT) * One located in TRANSPORTER, one in each ESCORT vehicle * Used as the primary mobile means of communication with the enroute elements for contact with MVMT CONTROL and enroute LEA. * Features: - Eleven VHF channels available in the frequency band from 152 162 MHz. - Channel selection pertinent to operating area is by manual pushbutton system. - Direct dialing or operator assisted calls are possible. - The MT generally must be within 20 miles of a phone-patching central for the system to be used. - Unreliable zones for MT communication and locations of phone-patching centrals for the routes of this plan are shown Enclosure 1 of Appendix E. Operating Information: - Enroute elements MT number shown on the equipment will be inc in the movement order for a particular shipment. - The operator of the MT will announce the telephone number of unit before terminating a call to comply with FCC rules. b. CB Radio Transceivers * One located in TRANSPORTER, one each ESCORT vehicle. * Used as the alternative mobile means of communication for contact MVMT CONTROL or enroute LEA in emergency situations, either direct by relay as necessary; used when MT is ineffective. * Also provides alternative mobile means of vehicle-to-vehicle communication in the event VHF transceiver fails. * Features: - Twenty-three HF AM channels available in the frequency band f 26.965 to 27.225 MHz. - Omnidirectional dipole antenna. - Mobile-to-base communications range: 1 to 10 miles; mobile-to-mobile communications range: 1 to 5 miles. - Locations of enroute LEA and REACT CB capabilities for the ro of this plan are shown in Enclosure 1 of Appendix E. * Operating Information: - CB call sign for Enroute Elements is __________________. - Operator of CB will announce above call sign before terminati call to comply with FCC rules. - Channel 9 is the emergency CB channel; REACT groups and many routinely monitor this channel. Channel 19 is currently moni widely by truckers. Information relay can generally be accomplished via either of these channels channel 9 relays, however, must be of an emergency nature. c. VHF Radio Transceivers * Each enroute vehicle is equipped with a unit. * The primary mobile means of vehicle-to-vehicle communication. * Features: - Two VHF FM channels, both set to the single company operating frequency of ____________ MHz. - Omnidirectional dipole antenna. - Communication range: 10 to 20 miles. * Hand portable units are available with Enroute Elements for off-ve communications. * Operating Information: - VHF call sign for enroute elements is __________________. - Operator of VHF radio will announce above call sign before terminating call to comply with FCC rules. d. Regular Telephone Calls Used as the primary non-mobile means of communication from enroute elem MVMT CONTROL and enroute LEA, and between MVMT CONTROL, the LEA, CONSIG and CONSIGNEE. * Operating Information: - ESCORT will make stops for necessary telephone usage by enrou elements in order to minimize requirements for TRANSPORTER st - MVMT CONTROL is located at ____________, ____________, teleph (____) ____-____; collect calls from LEA and enroute elements be accepted. - LEA telephone numbers for the routes of this plan are in Encl 3 of Appendix E. - CONSIGNOR and CONSIGNEE telephone numbers will be indicated i movement order for a particular shipment. 3. GENERAL OPERATING RULES AND CONSTRAINTS a. Company enroute elements will be identified as ____________ (Co. name) Number ____________ (Truck Number) in transmissions to LEA or for relay to LEA or CONTROL. b. Requests to CB REACT or other CB units for message relay to LEA or MVMT CONTROL will include name and telephone number of pertinent addressee. c. In the absence of a universally applicable standard code, the use of co words for communicating emergency information to non-company element is discourag d. Transmissions will be as short as possible consistent with assuring cla meaning. e. Radio channel will not be used whenever it is being actively used by an unit. To indicate that the channel is free for others to use, termination of the transmission of a radio conversation will be with the word "out," preceded by the pertinent company radio call sign. 4. TESTS AND MAINTENANCE a. Prior to departure of a shipment, all communication equipment will be c and maintained as necessary to ensure proper operation. b. During periods of communication inactivity while enroute, communication with CB and FM radio will be accomplished at least hourly to be aware of any comm deficiencies. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE The following listed tasks are assigned and practiced as standard operating procedure during a shipment to enhance the readiness of the operating elements fo executing the task reflected in the Responsibility Matrix attached. ESCORT and TRANSPORTER (Enroute Elements): 1. At each report to MVMT CONTROL, inform MVMT CONTROL of: - present location, enroute situation, next starting time - expected time and location of next planned report to MVMT CONTROL. 2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and MVMT CONTROL to render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor designate briefs a "getaway" messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event electronic communications fail. (A) 3. On the move and at stops, monitor the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net continuously. Members not in visual contact with Enroute Elements (at stops) will hand portable radios. (A) 4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information to other by the most expeditious means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice. (A) 5. Maintain TRANSPORTER vehicle locked and manned at all times so as to bl surprise penetration and to be prepared to move, operate communications, and immo cargo vehicle as dictated by the situation. (A) 6. At TRANSPORTER stops, park ESCORT vehicle with reference to the TRANSPO permit continuous observation, but not close enough to present a single target. 7. At TRANSPORTER stops, dispose the guards to obtain coverage of the TRAN position; ideally such positions would provide close-by cover for guard protectio observation and fields of fire covering the TRANSPORTER position, and mutual supp the guards. (A)MVMT CONTROL: 1. As indicated by the enroute security situation, contact each pertinent advance of TRANSPORTER arrival in the respective jurisdiction and inform them of: - the ID of Enroute Elements (company name, special number) - nature of shipment (handling nuclear cargo) - route and direction of movement - ETA and ETD for the jurisdiction - the enroute security situation of concern 2. Provide information, investigate assistance, and support as requested b Enroute Elements or dictated by situation. (A) 3. Maintain information on current status of shipment. 4. Keep Shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate) informed as to change movement plan and schedule, and of extraordinary enroute situations. (A)CONSIGNOR and CONSIGNEE (Terminal Elements): 1. Report expected and actual shipment departure and arrival times to each as applicable. (A) 2. Maintain current information on changes in movement plan and schedule; each other informed as appropriate. (A) 3. Provide safe haven for TRANSPORTER vehicle upon arrival and unloading o into appropriately protected facilities from TRANSPORTER. (A) 4. Shipper keeps NRC informed, as appropriate, of changes in movement plan schedule and of extraordinary enroute situations. (A)(Due to database constraints, Responsibility Matrix Tables are not included. Ple contact LIS to obtain a copy.)Appendix D PROCEDURES SUMMARY This appendix provides a ready reference to specific task sequences for the supervisor and each of the Operational Elements. The events that have similar ta sequences are grouped together along with the appropriate response procedures to for the various contingencies. The summary of procedures, responsibilities, and sequences is given in the six enclosures listed below: Enclosure 1. Enroute Supervisor's Procedures Summary Enclosure 2. Escort's Procedures Summary Enclosure 3. Transporter's Procedures Summary Enclosure 4. MVMT Control's Procedures Summary Enclosure 5. LEA's Procedures Summary Enclosure 6. Consignee's/Consignor's Procedures Summary Enclosure 1 Appendix D ENROUTE SUPERVISOR'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task s normally accomplished by the Enroute Supervisor. The context and background pers of these duties are presented in the basic plan. 2. ENROUTE SUPERVISOR'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES 1. Plans, directs, and coordinates the local movements and overall respons actions of the enroute elements while enroute. 2. Coordinates with MVMT CONTROL and ensures that required reports from en elements are submitted. 3. Requests assistance and coordinates operations with LEA providing respo assistance. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 1. At each report to MVMT CONTROL, inform them of: * present location, enroute situation, planned departure time; and * expected time and approximate location of the next planned report MVMT CONTROL. 2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and MVMT CONTROL to render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor will desi brief a "getaway" messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event mobile electronic communications fail. 3. On the move and at stops, ensure that the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net monitored continuously; members not in visual contact with enroute elements (at s will use the hand-portable radios. 4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information am enroute members by the fastest means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice. 5. At TRANSPORTER stops, park ESCORT vehicle with reference to the TRANSPO position to permit good observation of the position, but not close enough to pres single target. 6. Maintain TRANSPORTER vehicle locked and manned at all times so as to bl surprise penetration and to be prepared to move, operate communications, and immo cargo vehicle as directed by the situation. 4. ENROUTE SUPERVISOR'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR: * Receives or learns of an explicit threat made against the shipment, or * Infers that a threat could exist from suspicious activity encountered w enroute, e.g., - Protest demonstration or labor strike, - Unexplained route detour, - Unexplained road blockage, - Signaling to stop from apparent accident or maintenance problem, - Signaling to stop from apparent police patrol, - Suspicious persons tailing shipment, - Suspicious persons endeavoring to isolate a guard or driver at sto - Suspicious persons endeavoring close-up or hands-on inspection of TRANSPORTER, THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL: 1. Ensure that threat information and on-scene assessments of the threat situation are reported to MVMT CONTROL (and the Shipper when directed) as quickly possible, consistent with the local circumstances. 2. Direct and coordinate local movement to avoid suspicious circumstances cover the TRANSPORTER with the ESCORT where applicable. 3. As feasible, initiate and coordinate enroute investigate activity to ob information about the threat when necessary for assessment, e.g., * Query MVMT CONTROL on pertinent LEA, * Observation of situational activity, * Dispatch of ESCORT patrol to investigate. 4. Perform continuing assessments of the available threat information in l the on-going enroute circumstances to decide if the threat should be considered s while enroute. 5. If the threat is perceived serious or is reported to be so by duly cons authority and the source of the threat is not evident, coordinate with MVMT CONTR implement additional enroute security measures as appropriate to deal with any at that might be made to carry out the threat, e.g., * Cancellation or delay of shipment, * Use of alternative route or safe haven, * Increase of guard or escort strength, * Arrangement for and coordination with LEA escorts, * Review procedures and place operational emphasis on security tacti applicable, e.g., - ESCORT actions to minimize or eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops, - Dispersion and variation in enroute movement formations and o actions to reduce vulnerability and increase adversary operat problems, - Route reconnaissance and screening by advance guard patrols, - Continuous all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops, - Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain continuous mutual support among guard and TRANSPORTER positio 6. If the threat is perceived serious and is physically evident, i.e., sus activity encountered: * Alert ESCORT and TRANSPORTER to the seriousness of the situation. * Report situation to pertinent LEA as appropriate and request LEA escort Plan, direct, and coordinate TRANSPORTER movement to: - Continue avoiding the suspicious activity. - Screen and cover the TRANSPORTER with the ESCORT. - Avoid remote, low-traffic-density, low-speed routes. - Close on destination (or safe haven) as quickly as possible consis with safe speeds. 7. If an attack against the shipment is attempted or is imminent, perform indicated in paragraph 4.3. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR: * Learns that certain enroute safeguards capabilities have been degraded neutralized, e.g., - TRANSPORTER or ESCORT vehicle breaks down, - Radio or mobile telephone equipment is damaged or jammed, - Enroute personnel get suddenly sick, THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL: 1. Ensure, as applicable, that the situation is reported to MVMT CONTROL. 2. Investigate the circumstances of the degradation to determine if it ind a possible incursion attempt against the shipment. 3. If an attempted incursion is perceived or appears imminent, perform tas indicated in paragraph 4.3. 4. Otherwise, coordinate with MVMT CONTROL and LEA as applicable to arrang support needed to continue the cargo movement. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR: * Believes or is informed that an attack against the shipment is imminent process of development, THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL: 1. Contact pertinent enroute LEA, request assistance, and inform the LEA o situation, e.g., * Identification of shipment; current location of TRANSPORTER; route movement direction, * Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities. 2. Report the situation to MVMT CONTROL as soon as practical under the exi circumstances. 3. Direct and coordinate ESCORT and TRANSPORTER operations to: * Escape or avoid contact with the adversary and to move the TRANSPO toward the LEA or a local safe haven as appropriate. * Assist the LEA response forces to intercept and deal with the adve effectively. * Protect the TRANSPORTER and cargo against penetration if contact w the adversary is unavoidable. 4. If the adversary penetrates the TRANSPORTER and departs with any part o cargo, assist LEA intercept and hot-pursuit of the adversary by dispatching an ES patrol to follow the adversary and report his position and situation until the LE effectively gains contact. 5. If a shipment vehicle is damaged by adversary attack or otherwise, perf tasks indicated in paragraph 4.4. 6. If the adversary successfully escapes with any part of the cargo, repor theft and the circumstances related thereto to MVMT CONTROL and to local LEA as appropriate. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR: Learns that an ESCORT vehicle or the TRANSPORTER has been damaged by ac or an attempted adversary incursion against the shipment, THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL: 1. Arrange for local emergency medical, traffic control, and security assi via LEA contact as needed. 2. If the TRANSPORTER and cargo are reliably mobile and the ESCORT is not, reinforce TRANSPORTER guard with ESCORT personnel as feasible and direct TRANSPOR continue the trip. 3. Notify MVMT CONTROL of the situation; report any observations of theft might have occurred; and, as applicable, arrange for: * Additional escorts and cargo recovery or transfer assistance, alon replacement transportation as required to complete the shipment, * Emergency repair and evacuation services, * Emergency radiation monitoring and decontamination services. Enclosure 2 Appendix D ESCORT'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task s normally accomplished by the ESCORT. The context and background of these duties presented in the basic plan. 2. ESCORT'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES ESCORT will accomplish the general responsibilities listed below in coordina with the Enroute Supervisor and the TRANSPORTER. 1. Make reports to MVMT CONTROL and communication contacts with enroute LE eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops for such tasks. 2. Provide security screening for TRANSPORTER to obtain early warning of suspicious situations. 3. Assist TRANSPORTER movement to avoid suspicious situations, to prevent by actual or suspected adversaries, and to ensure continued progress toward the destination (or safe haven if appropriate). 4. Request LEA assistance to deal with suspected or actual adversary incur against the shipment or to investigate suspicious activity as appropriate. 5. Assist LEA convergence upon the TRANSPORTER location as required by the situation. 6. Guard and protect TRANSPORTER to prevent adversary access to or departu any @@ of the cargo. 7. Maintain visual contact with adversaries that gain possession of any pa the cargo and assist LEA convergence upon such adversaries. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 1. At each report to MVMT CONTROL, inform them of: * present location, enroute situation, planned departure time, * expected time and approximate location of the next planned report MVMT CONTROL. 2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and MVMT CONTROL to render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor will desi brief a "getaway" messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event mobile electronic communications fail. 3. On the move and at stops, monitor the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net continuously; members not in visual contact with enroute elements (at stops) will hand-portable radios. 4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information am enroute members by the fastest means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice. 5. At TRANSPORTER stops, park ESCORT vehicle with reference to the TRANSPO position to permit continuous observation of the position, but not close enough t a single target. 4. ESCORT'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT: * Receives or learns of an explicit threat made against the shipment, or * Infers that a threat could exist from suspicious situations encountered enroute, e.g., - Protest demonstration or labor strike, - Unexplained route detour, - Unexplained road blockage, - Signaling to stop from apparent accident or maintenance problem, - Signaling to stop from apparent police patrol, - Suspicious persons tailing shipment, - Suspicious persons endeavoring to isolate a guard or driver at sto - Suspicious persons endeavoring close-up or hands-on inspection of TRANSPORTER, THE ESCORT WILL: 1. Report all information concerning the threat to the Enroute Supervisor MVMT CONTROL and the Shipper as directed. 2. Assist the TRANSPORTER'S movement to avoid the suspicious situation as applicable. 3. Accomplish investigations as necessary to obtain additional information threat and to assist the Enroute Supervisor assess the seriousness of the situati 4. Accomplish additional enroute security measures to protect the TRANSPOR reduce its vulnerability as directed by the Enroute Supervisor, e.g., * Assimilation of additional escort strength as available, * Coordination with LEA escorts, * Actions to minimize or eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops, * Dispersion and variation in enroute movement formations and other actions to reduce vulnerability and increase adversary operational problems, * Route reconnaissance and screening by advance guard patrols, * Continuous all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particular stops or while in the vicinity of suspicious activity, * Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain cont mutual support among guard and TRANSPORTER positions. 5. If an attack against the shipment is attempted or is imminent, perform indicated in paragraph 4.3. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT: Observes a temporary degradation in certain enroute safeguards capabili e.g., - Vehicle breaks down, - Communication equipment is damaged or jammed, - Enroute personnel get suddenly sick, THE ESCORT WILL: 1. Investigate and report information on the circumstances leading to the and accomplish other actions as directed by the Enroute Supervisor. 2. If an incursion attempt against the shipment is associated with the obs degradation or is announced as imminent by the Enroute Supervisor, perform tasks in paragraph 4.3. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT: * Believes or is informed that an attack against the shipment is imminent process of developing, THE ESCORT WILL: 1. Report the situation immediately to the Enroute Supervisor and the TRAN as applicable, e.g., * Observed adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activi * Own dispositions and activity. 2. Inform pertinent LEA of the situation and request assistance as directe the Enroute Supervisor or otherwise as indicated by the situation. 3. Depending on the observed adversary situation, protect the TRANSPORTER by: * Challenging and turning away any adversary approach toward the TRANSPORTER if stationary, * Covering the TRANSPORTER'S escape from the situation by preventing diverting adversary pursuit, * Defending cargo to prevent penetration or to delay the adversary u effective LEA response arrives, * Following and maintaining visual contact if adversary gains posses of any part of the cargo. 4. Assist LEA convergence on the adversary by reporting location and situa changes occur. 5. If the adversary successfully escapes with any part of the cargo, repor observed information concerning the theft to the Enroute Supervisor and others as directed. 6. If a shipment vehicle is damaged by adversary action or otherwise, perf tasks indicated in paragraph 4.4. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT: * Observes that an enroute vehicle has been damaged by accident or advers attack, THE ESCORT WILL: 1. Report the location, circumstances, and extent of damage, as applicable the Enroute Supervisor and to MVMT CONTROL as indicated by the situation. 2. Accomplish ESCORT reorganization actions directed by the Enroute Superv 3. In coordination with TRANSPORTER and LEA, cordon off TRANSPORTER and an dispersal area if applicable, allowing no one to enter without prior approval fro Enroute Supervisor. 4. Assist recovery, inventory, and transfer operations as applicable, and continuing security for the cargo during the reorganization period. 5. Provide continued escort security as feasible on resumption of the carg movement. Enclosure 3 Appendix D TRANSPORTER'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task s normally accomplished by the TRANSPORTER. The context and background perspective duties are presented in the basic plan. 2. TRANSPORTER'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES The TRANSPORTER will accomplish the general responsibilities listed below in coordination with the Enroute Supervisor and the ESCORT. 1. Make reports to MVMT CONTROL and request LEA assistance as directed by Enroute Supervisor or otherwise as indicated by the situation. 2. Prevent adversary penetration of TRANSPORTER to deny adversary usage of TRANSPORTER mobility and to protect the cargo. 3. Use TRANSPORTER mobility to avoid suspicious situations, to escape susp or actual incursion attempts, and to maintain continued progress toward destinati safe haven if appropriate). 4. Immobilize cargo if TRANSPORTER momentum is lost because of adversary a 5. Assist LEA convergence on TRANSPORTER location as required by the situa 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 1. At each report to MVMT CONTROL, inform them of: * present location, enroute situation, planned departure time, * expected time and approximate location of the next planned report MVMT CONTROL. 2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and MVMT CONTROL to render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor will desi brief a "getaway" messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event mobile electronic communications fail. 3. On the move and at stops, monitor the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net continuously; members not in visual contact with enroute elements (at stops) will hand-portable radios. 4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information am enroute members by the fastest means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice. 5. At TRANSPORTER stops, park TRANSPORTER vehicle with reference to the ES permit continuous observation of the TRANSPORTER position, but not close enough t a single target. 6. Maintain TRANSPORTER vehicle locked and manned at all times so as to bl surprise penetration and to be prepared to move, operate communications, and immo cargo vehicle as dictated by the situation. 4. TRANSPORTER'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER: * Receives or learns of an explicit threat made against the shipment, or * Infers that a threat could exist from suspicious situations encountered enroute, e.g., - Protest demonstration or labor strike, - Unexplained route detour, - Unexplained road blockage, - Signaling to stop from apparent accident or maintenance problem, - Signaling to stop from apparent police patrol, - Suspicious persons tailing shipment, - Suspicious persons endeavoring to isolate a guard or driver at sto - Suspicious persons endeavoring close-up or hands-on inspection of TRANSPORTER, THE TRANSPORTER WILL: 1. Report the TRANSPORTER'S situation and all observations concerning the to the Enroute Supervisor and assist in assessing the seriousness of the situatio applicable. 2. Coordinate with available ESCORT assistance and move the TRANSPORTER ca as to avoid suspicious situations as applicable. 3. Accomplish additional security measures to protect the TRANSPORTER or r its vulnerability as directed by the Enroute Supervisor or otherwise as indicated situation, e.g., * Assimilation of additional assigned TRANSPORTER guards, * Coordination with LEA escorts, * Coordination with the Enroute Supervisor and the ESCORT to accompl required functions without having to stop the TRANSPORTER, * Continue all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly stops or while in the vicinity of suspicious activity, * Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain cont mutual support among guard and TRANSPORTER positions in the event attack. * Review of procedures and criteria for immobilizing cargo trailer i action becomes necessary. 4. If an attack against the shipment is attempted or is imminent, perform indicated in paragraph 4.3. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER: * Observes a temporary degradation in certain enroute safeguards capabili e.g., - Vehicle breaks down, - Communication equipment is damaged or jammed, - Enroute personnel get suddenly sick, THE TRANSPORTER WILL: 1. As applicable to the TRANSPORTER, investigate and report information on circumstances leading to the event and accomplish other actions directed by the E Supervisor. 2. If an incursion attempt against the shipment is associated with the obs degradation, or is announced as imminent by the Enroute Supervisor, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.3. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER: * Believes or is informed that an attack against the shipment is imminent process of development, THE TRANSPORTER WILL: 1. Report the situation immediately to the Enroute Supervisor and the ESCO applicable, e.g., * Observed adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activi * Own location and activity. 2. Inform pertinent LEA of the situation and request assistance as directe the Enroute Supervisor or otherwise as indicated by the situation. 3. Use the TRANSPORTER mobility to escape from a stationary situation or, mobile, to avoid adversary contact and to move toward LEA or local safe haven as applicable. 4. If the TRANSPORTER cannot escape from a stop or cannot maintain its mom because of adversary action, immobilize cargo in place if the vehicle is at a sto mobile, at a position selected to: * Effectively block traffic, * Afford little if any opportunity to conceal the cargo vehicle in t immediate vicinity. 5. If cargo vehicle is immobilized, occupy a position with the tractor, as feasible, that offers good observation and fields of fire covering the cargo loca 6. In coordination with the ESCORT, defend the cargo to prevent adversary penetration or departure with cargo until effective LEA response arrives. 7. If the adversary successfully escapes with any part of the cargo, repor observed information concerning the theft to the Enroute Supervisor and others as directed. 8. If a shipment vehicle is damaged by adversary action or otherwise, perf tasks indicated in paragraph 4.4. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER: * Observes that an enroute vehicle has been damaged by accident or advers attack, THE TRANSPORTER WILL: 1. Report the location, circumstances, and extent of damage, as applicable the Enroute Supervisor and to MVMT CONTROL as indicated by the situation. 2. If the TRANSPORTER is reliably mobile, the ESCORT is not, and the cargo intact, * Assimilate additional guards assigned by the Enroute Supervisor fr immobilized ESCORT and continue movement of the shipment. * Coordinate with enroute LEA escorts as arranged by MVMT CONTROL an directed by the Enroute Supervisor. 3. If the TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile or the cargo has been dispers * Coordinate with ESCORT and LEA as applicable to provide continuous security for the cargo and cargo dispersal area. * Assist in recovery, inventory, and transfer operations as indicate the situation. * Supervise local repair and evacuation operations regarding the TRANSPORTER as applicable. Enclosure 4 Appendix D MVMT CONTROL'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task s normally accomplished by MVMT CONTROL. The context and background perspective of duties are presented in the basic plan. 2. MVMT CONTROL'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES MVMT CONTROL will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordi with the Enroute Elements. 1. Track enroute progress as necessary during the shipment and inform enro of possible security threats against the shipment. 2. Arrange for and coordinate support and provide investigative assistance enroute elements as required by the situation to ensure continued protection and of the shipment to the destination (or safe haven if appropriate). 3. Maintain continuing cognizance of the enroute situation during the ship and request pertinent LEA assistance in absence of expected reports from enroute or to resolve suspicious situations. 4. Keep Shipper (CONSIGNOR or CONSIGNEE as applicable) informed of unusual shipment status. 5. Render reports to NRC and FBI as required by the situation and request assistance if needed. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 1. As indicated by the enroute security situation, e.g., a threat or suspi situation is perceived serious, contact each pertinent LEA in advance of TRANSPOR arrival in the respective jurisdictions and inform them of: * The identification of the Enroute Elements (Company Name, Truck Nu * Nature of the shipment (handling nuclear cargo), * Route and direction of movement, * ETA and ETD for the jurisdiction, * The enroute security situation of concern. 2. Provide information, investigative assistance, and support as requested Enroute Elements or as dictated by the situation. 3. Maintain information on current status of shipment. 4. Keep Shipper and NRC informed as to changes in movement plan and schedu of extraordinary enroute situations. 4. MVMT CONTROL'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THE MVMT CONTROL: * Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the shipment, THE MVMT CONTROL WILL: 1. Report as soon as practical all threat information and assessments to t Shipper and to the Enroute Elements and to NRC as arranged with the Shipper; asse additional information on the threat and adversary as available. 2. As applicable, assist the Shipper assess the threat if the shipment has yet departed from its origin. 3. If the shipment is underway from the origin to destination, analyze the available information on the threat to assess the seriousness of the situation. 4. If the threat is perceived to be serious or is reported to be serious b constituted authority, coordinate with the Shipper, Enroute Elements, and pertine as applicable, to implement increased security readiness appropriate to the perce seriousness of the situation, e.g.: * Cancellation or delay of the shipment. * Use of alternative planned routes. * Alerting and briefing of applicable safe haven objectives. * Arrangement for and coordination with LEA assistance and escorts. * Increase of assigned guard or escort strength. * Alerting of backup transportation and escort for standby status. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT MVMT CONTROL: * Receives a report from the Enroute Elements that certain enroute safegu capabilities have been temporarily degraded or neutralized, e.g., - TRANSPORTER or ESCORT vehicle breaks down, - Radio or mobile telephone equipment is damaged, - Enroute personnel get suddenly sick. THE MVMT CONTROL WILL: 1. Arrange for the provision of supporting assistance as requested by the Elements or otherwise as indicated by the situation. 2. Inform pertinent LEA, as applicable, and the Shipper if changes are mad the movement plan or schedule. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT MVMT CONTROL: * Receives a report from Enroute Elements or other duly constituted autho that: - An adversary attack has occurred against the shipment, - An enroute vehicle has been damaged by accident or by an adversary attack against the shipment, or - Part or all of the cargo has been stolen. THE MVMT CONTROL WILL: 1. Keep the Shipper and NRC informed of the situation as applicable, e.g., * The details of the adversary attack or the accident as known, * Amount of cargo stolen or dispersed as applicable, * The equipment damaged and personnel injured, * Ongoing actions to deal with the situation, * Any assistance needed at the scene from Federal or Shipper resourc i.e., inspection, recovery, inventory, decontamination, or transfe assistance. 2. Coordinate with Enroute Elements and LEA, as appropriate to the situati arrange for escorts and guards needed for continued protection of the shipment, a procurement of needed emergency maintenance and medical services. 3. If the TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile, * As appropriate to the situation, arrange for local evacuation of TRANSPORTER and cargo to a temporary safe haven to accomplish nece repair or transfer operations. * Dispatch additional escorts, replacement cargo vehicle, and materials-handling equipment needed to complete the shipment. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THE MVMT CONTROL: * Receives a report that the Enroute Elements have been delayed or divert the planned route or that they have not arrived at the destination as expected, or * Does not receive an expected report from the Enroute Elements, THE MVMT CONTROL WILL: 1. Contact LEA jurisdictions along the route from the location of the last from the Enroute Elements to the location of the next planned report to determine information that might indicate a valid delay. 2. According to information gained from the above queries, request the LEA * Attempt to locate the shipment. * Determine reasons for delay if any. * Report shipment's status and situation as determined. * Render assistance to the shipment as indicated by the situation. 3. If the shipment is located by the LEA and is delayed because of vehicle damage, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.3. 4. If the shipment is located by LEA and is delayed or detoured for no obv valid reasons, * Assume attempted theft. * Request LEA protect shipment until relief crew arrives. * Dispatch ESCORT and TRANSPORTER relief crew to complete the shipme * Report incident to NRC and FBI for investigation as appropriate. 5. If shipment cannot be located but subsequently reports, request pertine to verify that the shipment is located and moving as reported; if it is not, requ to search for TRANSPORTER and apprehend; report incident to NRC and FBI for furth investigation as appropriate. 6. If shipment cannot be located, assume that the shipment has been stolen report known information concerning the suspected theft to the Shipper, NRC, FBI, appropriate state LEA. Enclosure 5 Appendix D LEA'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and task sequences tha requested of the pertinent LEA in the planned contingency situations. The contex background perspective of these actions are presented in the basic plan. 2. LEA'S GENERAL FUNCTIONS The LEAs have an overall responsibility to maintain law and order within the respective jurisdictional area. With their available resources, they endeavor to illegal activities, solve crimes, and apprehend law breakers. Within the context law enforcement responsibilities, applicable LEA along NRC planned routes have be requested to perform the functions listed below in response to contingency situat 1. Provide investigative assistance to check on a suspicious enroute situa to determine status of a shipment. 2. Provide temporary escort for those shipments requiring an increased sta readiness owing to threats or suspicious situations that are encountered enroute. 3. Provide a response force to deal with unlawful adversary actions agains shipments within their jursidiction. 4. Provide traffic control and area isolation (cordon) for post-accident o post-attack situations. 5. Assist Enroute Elements to obtain emergency medical care and maintenanc assistance if needed. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES Applicable LEA along NRC planned routes have been requested to: 1. Maintain general awareness of the frequency, company, identities, enrou composition, and the routes of the SNM shipments within their jurisdiction. 2. Report any available information to the NRC and the FBI that is indicat possible danger to a shipment. 4. LEA TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING: * An explicit threat against the shipment, or * A civil disturbance or other suspicious occurrence encountered while en THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: 1. Report threat information to local FBI and to pertinent NRC Regional Headquarters. 2. Provide information and investigative assistance as necessary. 3. Assist in assessing the threat as applicable. 4. Provide temporary escort of the shipment, as arranged in coordination w MVMT CONTROL, and coordinate with adjacent jurisdictions to ensure continuing LEA as necessary. 5. Prepare to respond with additional force if necessary to deal with unla acts against the shipment. 6. Report situation information and passage of shipment to succeeding LEA jurisdictions by telephone (collect or WATS) to MVMT CONTROL. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING: * An unlawful attack against the shipment, THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: 1. Converge LEA patrols on the TRANSPORTER location to intercept and deal the adversary. 2. Pursue and apprehend adversary as necessary to recover the TRANSPORTER cargo in their possession. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING: * Cargo dispersal, * Vehicle damage, or * Sick or injured personnel in need of care, THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: 1. Arrange for local maintenance, radiation monitoring, and medical assist required by the situation. 2. Accomplish traffic control as necessary to isolate damaged cargo vehicl dispersal area. 3. Provide temporary security assistance and escorts as needed to protect shipment as arranged in coordination with MVMT CONTROL or the Enroute Supervisor. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING: * A delay or diversion of Enroute Elements from the planned route, or * Enroute Elements not reporting or arriving as expected, THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO: 1. Accomplish investigation of the situation and inform MVMT CONTROL of re 2. Hold shipment in custody until disposition is arranged by MVMT CONTROL shipment is: * Not following the indicated route and schedule, or * Delayed or detoured for obviously invalid or suspicious reasons. Enclosure 6 Appendix D CONSIGNOR'S/CONSIGNEE'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY 1. PURPOSE This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task s normally accomplished by the CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE. The context and background of duties are presented in the basic plan. 2. CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE will accomplish the general responsibilities listed belo coordination with MVMT CONTROL. 1. Keep each other informed of shipment status and departure and arrival t appropriate. 2. Render reports to NRC and FBI as indicated by the situation and request assistance if needed. 3. Provide support for enroute elements as required by the situation. 3. STANDARD PROCEDURES 1. Report expected and actual shipment departure and arrival times to each and to NRC as applicable. 2. Maintain current information on changes in movement plan and schedule a each other informed as appropriate. 3. Provide safe haven for TRANSPORTER upon arrival and unloading of cargo appropriately protected facilities. 4. CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE TASK SEQUENCES 4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CONSIGNOR or CONSIGNEE: * Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the shipment, THE CONSIGNOR OR CONSIGNEE WILL: * Report without delay all threat information: - To each other as applicable. - To MVMT CONTROL and NRC (if the Shipper). If the shipment has not departed, the Shipper will: * Assemble any available information on the threat and the adversary from pertinent LEA, MVMT CONTROL, and CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate. * Analyze the available information to assess the seriousness of the thre * If the threat is perceived serious or is reported to be so by duly cons authority, - Coordinate with MVMT CONTROL to arrange for increased readiness of enroute elements and LEA or for cancellation or delay of shipment appropriate to the assessed seriousness of the threat situation. - Report the assessed seriousness of the threat and contemplated enr readiness actions to NRC. If the shipment has already departed, the Shipper will: * As applicable, assist MVMT CONTROL in assessing the threat situation an NRC informed of the enroute situation. 4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SHIPPER (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE AS APPLICABLE): * Learns that the TRANSPORTER vehicle has been damaged by accident or adv attack, THE SHIPPER WILL: 1. Coordinate with MVMT CONTROL to determine the on-scene situation and assistance required. 2. Report the situation to NRC and request additional resources, as requir from Federal Agencies. 3. Dispatch health physics personnel, recovery and inventory teams to the to accomplish necessary cargo recovery, inventory, transfer, and decontamination operations. 4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE: * Observes or learns that the enroute elements do not arrive at the desti as expected, THE SHIPPER WILL: * Report non-arrival of shipment to NRC and to CONSIGNEE, as appropriate. * Coordinate with MVMT CONTROL to initiate tracer investigation and keep CONSIGNEE informed of the trace results as appropriate. THE CONSIGNEE WILL: * Report non-arrival of shipment at destination to the CONSIGNOR and NRC. 4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE: * Learns or infers that enroute cargo has been stolen, THE CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE WILL: 1. Report known information of theft and circumstances related thereto to NRC. 2. Assist efforts to recover the stolen materials. APPENDIX E PRIMARY ROUTE: ALPHA PLANT, JONESVILLE, X., TO BRAVO PLANT, SMITHVILLE, G. This appendix provides enroute information for the primary route of shipment Alpha plant to Bravo plant. This route starts at the Alpha plant area 10 and fol access road to U.S. Route 99, east into Bingo City, thence Interstate 77 east to City intersection with State Route 714. It then proceeds north on State Route 71 intersection of Smith Road, thence south on Smith Road to Bravo plant. The follo enclosures are included: Enclosure 1. Route Overview Enclosure 2. Time and Distance Factors Enclosure 3. Law Enforcement Response Summary Enclosure 4. Law Enforcement Capabilities (Due to database constraints, Enclosures 1-3 of Appendix E are not included. Ple contact LIS to obtain a copy.)ENCLOSURE 4 - APPENDIX E LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES The eleven County Sheriffs that provide the primary response force for the Jonesville, Xray, to Smithville, Gamma, route have county patrol strengths varyin to 42 officers. Their normal patrol unit in general consists of one man per vehic Patrols are armed with individual's pistols and a riot control shotgun. In an em situation, these weapons can be augmented with automatic weapons, semiautomatic r and tear gas if required. The referenced city police forces along the route have or greater capabilities. In all cases, there are mutual aid agreements with adja higher jurisdictions that would be used to obtain reinforcements if necessary. All the referenced enroute LEA, with the sole exception of the Gamma State H Patrol have modern car-to-car radio communication systems. Unfortunately there i single channel that will provide continuous communications by the enroute element the enroute LEA forces. However, all the county LEA either monitor the citizen's radio or work with a local REACT group. Each enroute Sheriff's department typically operates a central dispatch faci that has equipment to maintain communication between counties, between a county a adjacent states, and between a county and local and state law agencies. In addit there are hot-line telephones or one-digit dial systems between adjacent LEA jurisdictions. In addition to car-to-car and car-to-central-station radio communications, m patrol units also have a walkie talkie system that can be relayed by the vehicle the base station. 55 |